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JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE
FINDINGS OF MENTAL DISTRESS
RESULTING FROM SEX DISCRIMINATION
Section 10:5-4 of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination'
prohibits sex-based discrimination' in employment3 and other areas.4
New Jersey courts have construed the law to enable the Director of
the Division on Civil Rights to award damages for pain, humiliation
and mental suffering to victims of such discrimination.5 Judicial re-
view of such agency fact-finding determinations in on-the-record ad-
i. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 10:5-1 to -38 (West 1976 & Supp. 1979).
2. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-4 (West 1976). The law also outlaws discrimination on
the basis of race, creed, color, national origin, ancestry, age and marital status. Id
3 N J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12 (West Supp. 1979) provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice. . . . [flor an employer, because of
the race, creed, color, national origin, ancestry, age, marital status or sex of any
individual, . . . to refuse to hire or employ or to bar or to discharge from em-
ployment such individual or to discriminate against such individual in compen-
sation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment ....
4. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-4 (West 1976). The Act also forbids sex-based discrimi-
nation in obtaining accommodations, public housing, and other real property. Id
5. Zahorian v. Russell Fitt Real Estate Agency, 62 N.J. 399, 301 A.2d 754 (1973)
(the New Jersey Supreme Court upheld the authority of the Division on Civil Rights
to award compensatory damages for pain and mental suffering to a victim of sex-
based discrimination in housing); Director, Div. on Civil Rights v. Slumber Inc., 166
N.J. Super. 95, 398 A.2d 1345 (1979) (the court affirmed the Director's award of dam-
ages for mental distress resulting from racial discrimination in hotel accommoda-
tions); Harvard v. Bushberg Bros. Inc., 137 N.J. Super. 537, 350 A.2d 65 (1975) (the
court upheld the Director's award of damages for mental distress resulting from sex-
based discrimination in employment). Courts base authority for such awards on the
portion of the Act which grants the Division on Civil Rights the "power to prevent
and eliminate" and -to take other actions" against unlawful discrimination, N.J.
STAT ANN. § 10:5-6 (West 1976), and on the portion of the Act which provides that:
If upon all evidence at the hearing the director shall find that the respondent has
engaged in any unlawful employment practice or unlawful discrimination as de-
fined in this act, the director shall state his findings of fact and conclusions of law
and shall issue and cause to be served on such respondent an order requiring
such respondent to cease and desist from such unlawful employment practice or
unlawful discrimination and to take such affirmative action, including, but not
limited to, hiring, reinstatment or upgrading of employees, with or without back
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judicatory proceedings6 generally requires application of the
substantial evidence test.' Under this test, courts have a great deal of
discretion,8 often yielding uncertain applications.' This problem is
apparent in the case of Castellano v. Linden Board of Education'°
where the New Jersey Supreme Court found insubstantial evidence
to support an agency award of damages for mental distress. I
Complainant, a tenured first-grade school teacher employed by the
Linden Board of Education, gave birth one week prior to the begin-
ning of the school year. 2 Her physician certified that she could re-
turn to work one month after childbirth.' 3 Pursuant to a collectively
pay, .. as, in the judgment of the director, will effectuate the purpose of this act
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-17 (West Supp. 1979).
Courts in other jurisdictions allow similar agencies to award damages for mental
distress resulting from discrimination. See, e.g., Massachusetts Comm'n Against Dis-
crimination v. Franzaroli, 357 Mass. 112, 256 N.E.2d 311 (1970) (the Massachusetts
Supreme Court upheld an award granted by the Massachusetts Commission Against
Discrimination of $250 for damages of mental distress to a victim resulting from ra-
cial discrimination in housing); Williams v. Joyce, 4 Or. App. 482, 479 P.2d 513 (1971)
(the Oregon Court of Appeals upheld a decision of the Commissioner of the Civil
Rights Division of the Bureau of Labor awarding damages for mental distress to a
victim of racial discrimination in housing).
6. The evidentiary support for agency fact-finding determinations must be on a
public record compiled through formal adjudicatory proceedings. Judicial review of
informal agency rulemaking and fact-finding determinations where there is no re-
quirement that the evidence be on the record is usually governed by the arbitrary and
capricious standard of review. This standard provides that an agency's determina-
tions cannot be overturned unless they are "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discre-
tion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1976).
7. E.g., 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (1976) provides:
To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the reviewing court shall
decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provi-
sions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency ac-
tion. The reviewing court shall. . . hold unlawful and set aside agency action,
findings, and conclusions found to be. . . unsupported by substantial evidence
in a case subject to sections 556 and 557 of this title or otherwise reviewed on the
record of an agency hearing provided by statute. . . . See notes 26-35 and ac-
companying text infra.
8. See notes 62-67 and accompanying text infra.
9. See note 60 infra.
10. 79 N.J. 407, 400 A.2d 1182 (1979).
11. See note 21 infra.
12. Complainant gave birth on August 29, 1974. 79 N.J. at 408, 400 A.2d at 1182
(1979).
13. Her physician certified that she could return to work on September 27, 1974.
Id at 408, 400 A.2d at 1182.
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negotiated agreement between the Board of Education and the teach-
ers' union, the Board required her to take a one year maternity leave
of absence.' 4
Complainant filed a complaint with the New Jersey Division on
Civil Rights alleging sex discrimination. 5 The Director of the Divi-
sion found discrimination in the Board's policies in violation of the
New Jersey Law Against Discrimination. 6 The Director awarded
complainant $3,557.10 for loss of pay,1 7 and $600 damages for humil-
iation, pain and mental suffering.'" The Appellate Division of the
14. The agreement stipulated that the teacher could return to work at the begin-
ning of the next school year following termination of her pregnancy, or the com-
mencement of the next succeeding school year subject to the approval of the Board of
Education. Id at 409 n.1, 400 A.2d at 1183 n.l.
15. The complaint charged that application of the Board's mandatory one-year
maternity leave policy and refusal to allow complainant to use her accumulated sick
leave for her absence due to childbirth constituted sex-based discrimination. Before a
determination by the Director on the complaint, the Board, on December 9, 1974,
permitted complainant to return to her teaching duties. id at 409, 400 A.2d at 1183.
16. See note 3 supra.
17 The Director awarded back pay for complainant's loss of pay from September
1974 to December 9, 1974 (the date she returned to work). The Director's order per-
mitted the respondent to credit the complainant with 16 days of sick leave. The 16
days represented the period complainant was disabled following the birth of her
child, and the Director concluded that these days should be charged against her accu-
mulated sick leave. 79 N.J. at 409, 400 A.2d at 1183.
18 Evidence supporting the $600 award included letters received by the com-
plainant from the Superntendent of Schools and the Board's counsel referring to the
contractual provisions for maternity leave and sick leave. The Board notified com-
plainant that it had granted her a maternity leave of absence from September 1, 1974
to June 30, 1975. At the hearing conducted by the Division on Civil Rights, com-
plainant testified as to her personal reaction to these letters: "First upset-I couldn't
believe it, I couldn't believe that this was happening to me. I saw no basis for this.
Upset. Cried. Stayed in the house for a while." She then explained why she was
upset
Because I didn't think that something like this could happen to me. I was afraid
of the way people would react to me; just the whole thing, the whole-just upset
me
Q, Did you cry on one occasion or on more than one occasion?
A. No, many.
Q. How long a period would you say this upset lasted?
A Oh, a couple of weeks, I guess.
Complainant testified that she had known about the contractual provisions concern-
ing maternity leave and sick leave for quite some time. She claimed that she was still
depressed "because of this case." Id at 411, 400 A.2d at 1183-84.
Complainant's husband also testified that his wife was upset because of a conversa-
tion he had with the superintendent of schools. The superintendent stated, "What
1980]
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New Jersey Superior Court affirmed.' 9 On appeal, the New Jersey
Supreme Court upheld the finding of discrimination,2" but struck
down the award of $600 for pain, humiliation and mental suffering
for lack of substantial evidence.2'
Neither the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination z" nor the
state's Administrative Procedure Act 3 articulates the judicial stan-
dard for review of administrative agency fact-finding. Consequently,
New Jersey courts have adopted 4 the federal Administrative Proce-
dure Act standard25 which allows rejection of an administrative
agency's factual conclusions only if the court finds them unsupported
by substantial evidence.2 6 When applying the test, the reviewing
kind of father are you or husband to have. . .[and] want your wife to go back so
soon." Id at 419, 400 A.2d at 1188. (Handler, J., concurring and dissenting).
19. Castellano v. Linden Bd. of Educ., 158 N.J. Super. 350, 386 A.2d 396 (1978).
20. The court found that while the one-year maternity leave may have been well
intentioned (the intention being to effectuate the Board's policy of continuity of class-
room instruction), in effect it discriminated against teachers because of their sex. The
court also found it discriminatory not to allow a pregnant teacher who becomes physi-
cally disabled and unable to attend to her teaching duties to use her accumulated sick
leave since it could be used for any other period of absence due to physical disability.
79 N.J. 407, 412-13, 400 A.2d 1182, 1184-85 (1979).
21. The majority felt there was no basis for any feeling of humiliation since
mandatory maternity leaves were common. The court also took into consideration
the fact that the Board of Education had acted in "good faith" in accordance with the
negotiated contractual agreement which provided for a one-year maternity leave. Id
at 411, 400 A.2d at 1184.
Judge Handler dissented from this part of the decision. In his opinion it was obvi-
ous that the complainant was upset and disturbed as a result of the Board's discrimi-
nation against her. He noted the importance of court adherence to the Director's
determination that the evidence of mental distress was substantial, since the Division
of Civil Rights is better equipped to spot discrimination and realize its potential ef-
fects. Judge Handler stated:
Discrimination frequently goes uncorrected because it is undetected. This is why
governmental responsibility in the civil rights field has been placed in an admin-
istrative body that is expected to have the keenness to see through these forms of
cultural blindness and spot discrimination where it exists. . . .And, this is why
it is important for courts to defer to the factual assessments of such administra-
tive agencies.
Id at 420, 400 A.2d at 1189. (Handler, J , concurring and dissenting).
22. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 10:5-1 to -38 (West 1976 & Supp. 1979).
23. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:14B-1 to 15 (West 1976).
24. See note 26 infra.
25. See note 7 supra.
26. See Atkinson v. Parsekian, 37 N.J. 143, 179 A.2d 732 (1962) (appeal from a
decision of the acting director of the'Division of Motor Vehicles suspending two driv-
ers' licenses for one year each after the motorists had been involved in a fatal automo-
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court must consider whether a reasonable mind would accept the evi-
dence as adequate to form a conclusion.27 That the court would have
reached a different conclusion on the same set of facts is irrelevant;
courts cannot substitute their judgment for that of an agency merely
because there is evidence to support the court's point of view.28 This
bile accident). In discussing the standard of review applicable on this appeal, the
court found that the factual determinations of the administrative agency must be sus-
tained if they are supported by substantial evidence. Id at 149, 179 A.2d at 735. See
also Matter of Heller, 73 N.J. 292, 374 A.2d 1191 (1962) (review of a decision of the
New Jersey State Board of Pharmacy revoking the license of a pharmacist on charges
of grossly unprofessional conduct). The Board found that the pharmacist indiscrimi-
nately sold codeine-based cough syrup, classified as a controlled substance. On ap-
peal, the New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed the Board's findings of fact, as based on
substantial evidence.
The substantial evidence standard of review applies only when the evidentiary sup-
port for the fact-finding determinations is on the record and compiled through formal
adjudicatory proceedings. 4 K DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 29.01
(1958).
27. Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938). See L. JAFFE,
JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 596 (1965), in which Jaffe suggests
that the test should be whether a reasoning mind would accept the evidence as ade-
quate to support a conclusion. See generally W. GELLHORN, C. BYSE & P. STRAUSS,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, CASES AND COMMENTS 257 (7th ed. 1979).
The court, in making such a determination, must review the entire record to deter-
mine if there is substantial evidence "in the record as a whole" to support the agency's
determination. The court must consider evidence in the record which detracts from
the evidence relied on by the agency. 5 B. MEZINES, J. STERN & J. GRUFF, ADMINIS-
TRATIVE LAW § 51.02 (1979). This requirement does not negate the function of the
agency as the one equipped to deal with a specialized field of knowledge, whose find-
ings stem from an expertise which courts must respect. Nor does it mean that a court
may choose between two conflicting inferences, even though the court would have
made a different choice had the review been de novo. Review of the record as a
whole merely means that a court may set aside agency findings if it cannot find sub-
stantial evidence to support them, viewing the record in its entirety, including the
evidence opposed to the agency's view. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S.
474, 488 (195 1). See generally K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT § 29.03 (3d ed.
1972).
28 See Consolo v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 383 U.S. 607 (1966) (appeal from
a decision of the Federal Maritime Commission assessing damages for violation of
the Shipping Act). The Court of Appeals reversed and vacated the award on the
ground that there was substantial evidence to support a conclusion contrary to that
reached by the Federal Maritime Commission. Reversing the Court of Appeals deci-
sion, the Supreme Court stated, "We have defined 'substantial evidence' as 'such rele-
vant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion'
• [T]he possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence
does not prevent an administrative agency's findings from being supported by sub-
stantial evidence." Id at 619-20 (Quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. Labor Bd., 305
U.S. 197, 229 (1938)).
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standard of review is analogous to that applied by a trial judge in
deciding whether to override a jury by issuing a directed verdict.29
In applying the substantial evidence standard of review, courts
must give deference to the agency's expertise.3" Expertise, however,
is not a substitute for evidence in the record.3" The responsibility for
weighing evidence,32 determining the credibility of witnesses, 3 and
29. NLRB v. Columbia Enameling and Stamping Co., 306 U.S. 292, 300 (1939).
A different standard of review applies, however, to findings of a judge without a jury.
Such findings may be overturned if they are clearly erroneous. 4 K. DAVIS, ADMIN-
ISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 29.02 (1958). This test is broader than the substantial
evidence test because a finding is clearly erroneous when the reviewing court is left
with the firm conviction that a mistake has been committed, regardless of whether or
not there is evidence to support it. Under the substantial evidence test, courts may not
substitute their judgement for that of an administrative agency if there is sufficient
evidence to support the agency's findings. Id
30. Giving proper respect to the expertise of the administrative agency frees the
reviewing court from the task of weighing the evidence and drawing inferences and
conclusions from it. Judicial deference to the agency's expertise helps promote the
uniform application of the substantial evidence test and serves to protect the auton-
omy of the administrative agency. The rule also minimizes the opportunity for re-
viewing courts to substitute their judgment for that of an agency. Consolo v. Federal
Maritime Comm'n, 383 U.S. 607, 620-21 (1966). Deference is necessary because ad-
ministrative tribunals possess superior fact-finding abilities and are more efficient in
disposing of controversies within the realm of their specialized field. These tribunals
must be free of judicial control when they are carrying out their executive functions
pursuant to policies enunciated by the legislature. L. Schwartz, Legal Restriction of
Competition in the Regulated Industries: An Abdication of Judicial Responsibiiitg 67
HARV. L. REV. 436, 473 (1954).
31. Deference must be given to an administrative agency's expertise. If, however,
substantial evidence cannot be found on the record, the reviewing court must reverse
the agency's findings. The purpose of this rule is to place practical limits on agency
discretion. Otherwise, "the requirement for administrative decisions based on sub-
stantial evidence and reasoned findings-which alone make effective judicial review
possible-would become lost in the haze of so called expertise." Baltimore & Ohio R.
Co. v. Aberdeen & Rockfish R. Co., 393 U.S. 87, 92 (1968).
32. See In re Grossman, 127 N.J. Super. 13, 316 A.2d 39 (1974) (male tenured
teacher who underwent sex-reassignment surgery challenged the decision of the
Board of Education to dismiss him from the public school system on the grounds that
his retention would result in potential emotional harm to his students). Medical testi-
mony supported both sides of the issue. The Commissioner resolved the conflicting
medical evidence in favor of the Board. In upholding the Board's decision, the court
reasoned that it was not within its competency to balance the persuasiveness of the
evidence on one side as against the other. Id at 23, 316 A.2d at 46. This rule recog-
nizes that administrative tribunals are better able than a reviewing court to resolve
controversies within the realm of their field. See note 30 supra.
33. See Pilon v. Board of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 112 N.J. Super. 436, 271
A.2d 611 (1970) (appeal from a determination of the Director of the Division of Alco-
holic Beverage Control that holders of a plenary retail consumption license permitted
(Vol. 19.279
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drawing inferences and conclusions from the evidence,34 lies exclu-
sively with the administrative agency. This standard serves to protect
the autonomy of the administrative process by displaying respect for
the agency's judgment.35
Application of the substantial evidence test to cases involving ad-
ministrative agency awards of damages for mental distress to victims
of discrimination has often been inconsistent and uncertain.3 6 Some
a fight to take place on the licensed premises, hindered and delayed a police officer in
the performance of his duty, sold and served alcoholic beverages after hours, and
permitted one of the owners to work in the licensed premises while intoxicated). The
police officer who was assaulted at the bar testified at the hearing about the alleged
violations. The appeal challenged his credibility as a witness. The court held that
"[t]he choice of accepting or rejecting the testimony of witnesses rests with the admin-
istrative agency, and where such choice is reasonably made it is conclusive on ap-
peal." Id at 441, 271 A.2d at 613. See generally K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TEXT § 29.06 (3d ed. 1972).
34. Drawing inferences from basic facts or from a witness' testimony is the heart
of the fact-finding process. Courts may not choose between two conflicting inferences
if there is substantial evidence to support the agency's conclusions. See note 28 and
accompanying text supra. The test is whether a reasonable mind could have reached
the same conclusions reached by the administrative agency. See Cooley's Anemia
Blood & Research Foundation for Children, Inc., v. Legalized Games of Chance
Control Comm'n, 78 N.J. Super. 128, 187 A.2d 731 (1963) (appeal from an order of
the Legalized Games of Chance Control Commission suspending a charitable organi-
zation's bingo license for 18 months). The court held that the Commissioner's find-
ings that the organization had not fully and accurately reported bingo game receipts
and expenditures were supported by substantial evidence. The court explained: "The
question in every case is whether a reasonable man, acting reasonably, could have
reached the administrative agency decision under review, from the evidence found in
the entire record, including the inferences to be drawn therefrom." Id at 140, 187
A.2d at 737.
Reviewing courts may, however, substitute their judgment for that of an agency if
they choose to turn a question of inference into a question of law. By holding that an
inference is either required or unreasonable, the court in effect converts a question of
inference into a question of law. Only when a court decides that an inference is rea-
sonable does the question remain one of fact, within the realm of administrative de-
termination. 4 K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 29.05 (1958).
35. The substantial evidence rule is defined to prevent the court from engaging in
nonjudicial activities. Administrative agencies carry out executive functions pursuant
to policies enunciated by the legislature. If courts were to exercise these same func-
tions when reviewing an administrative determination, they would theoretically be in
violation of the separation of powers doctrine. To avoid this result and to preserve
the autonomy of the administrative agency, the substantial evidence rule imposes
upon the court a duty to respect the agency's judgment, provided it is based upon
sufficient evidence. See generally K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT § 29.09 (3d
ed. 1972).
36. See notes 57-67 and accompanying text infra.
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courts employ a one-part test where substantial evidence of discrimi-
nation is sufficient to establish causation of mental distress.37 Other
courts apply a two-part test, requiring substantial evidence of mental
distress as well as substantial evidence of discrimination.3 8 This en-
ables a court to find discrimination but still overturn an award of
damages for mental distress.
The New Jersey Supreme Court in Zahorian v. Russell Fi Real
Estate Agency39 applied the one-part test to uphold a decision of the
Director of the Division on Civil Rights granting compensatory dam-
ages for pain and mental suffering to a victim of sex-based discrimi-
nation in housing. The court found sufficient evidence of
discrimination4 ° to establish causation of mental distress,4 ' and de-
ferred to the agency's finding of it.42 Zahorian marked the first time
the New Jersey Supreme Court recognized the Director's authority to
37. See notes 39-47 and accompanying text infra.
38. See notes 48-54 and accompanying text infra.
39. 62 N.J. 399, 301 A.2d 754 (1973).
40. Complainant, a 24 year-old, single, employed female sought a two bedroom
apartment for herself and a female friend. In a telephone conversation, an agent of
the Russell Fitt Real Estate Agency informed complainant that the agency had at
least two two-bedroom apartments available. The agent, however, informed the com-
plainant that the owners would not rent the apartments to single girls, and therefore
she would not show them. She refused to show the apartment or give the names and
addresses of the owners or apartment superintendents. Complainant testified that she
had four such telephone conversations with the agent. Despite contradictory testi-
mony given by the agent, the Hearing Examiner of the Division on Civil Rights found
the complainant's testimony credible. The Director of the Division affirmed the
Hearing Examiner's findings of discrimination and the New Jersey Supreme Court
upheld the findings on appeal. Id at 402-06, 301 A.2d at 756-58.
41. Due to the indignity visited upon victims of discrimination and the humilia-
tion that is caused, the court recognized that mental distress may directly result from
discrimination. Applying this to the present case, the court simply stated, "[Tjhere
was ample evidence to establish causation . I..." ld at 416, 301 A.2d at 763.
42. The evidence of mental distress consisted of complainant's own testimony that
the discriminatory treatment had humiliated her and caused her actual physical and
emotional pain. She testified that as a result of her phone conversations, she suffered
such severe stomach upset that she was forced to consult her physician on several
occasions. Complainant's mother testified that her daughter was extremely upset,
would not eat, and complained about headaches. She accompanied her daughter on
visits to the physician who told her that her stomach distress was just nerves. Com-
plainant and her mother both testified that when she abandoned her efforts to obtain
a two-bedroom apartment for herself and her friend, and ultimately settled for a one-
bedroom apartment in another area, her physical and emotional distress terminated.
Id at 404, 301 A.2d at 757.
[Vol. 19.279
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award such incidental damages.43
New Jersey lower court decisions involving sex-based' and racial
discrimination 45 have consistently applied the one-part test to reach
similar results. Citing Zahorian as precedent, these courts affirmed
the Director's award of compensatory damages for humiliation with-
out discussing the evidence on the record regarding mental distress. 46
Both courts found ample evidence of discrimination to establish cau-
sation of mental distress.4 7 In sustaining awards of damages for
mental pain and suffering, these courts held that substantial evidence
of discrimination alone could establish causation of mental distress.
Courts in other jurisdictions 8 sometimes apply the two-part test,
however, requiring both substantial evidence of discrimination and
substantial evidence of mental distress. In School District No. 1 v.
Nilsen," the Oregon Supreme Court reversed a decision of the Com-
mission of the Bureau of Labor" which awarded damages for mental
distress for sex discrimination in employment.:' The court found
sufficient evidence of discrimination, but held that the evidence failed
43 4ward of Damages for Humiliation and Mental Anguish by Civil Rights Divi-
sion, 96 N.J.L.J. 372 (1973).
44 See Harvard v. Bushberg Bros., Inc., 137 N.J. Super. 537, 350 A.2d 65 (1975)
(complainant denied job promotion due to sex-based discrimination).
45 See Director, Div. on Civil Rights v. Slumber, Inc., 166 N.J. Super. 95, 398
A 2d 1345 (1979) (racial discrimination in hotel accommodations).
46 In Harvard. the court noted that complainant complained of physical ail-
ments. The court, however, did not elaborate on the nature of those ailments. 137
N J Super. 537, 541, 350 A.2d 65, 68 (1975).
47 The court in Harvard simply stated that, "There was ample evidence to estab-
lish causation .... " No discussion of the issue followed. Id at 541, 350 A.2d at 68.
In Slumber, the court, infering that racial discrimination humiliates its victims, held
that the finding of discrimination was based on substantial evidence, and that the
resulting insult was sufficient to sustain an award of damages for mental distress. 166
N.J. Super. 95, 104-05, 398 A.2d 1345, 1350 (N.J. Super. 1979).
48. See notes 49-54 and accompanying text infra.
49. 271 Or. 461, 534 P.2d 1135 (1975).
50. Id
51. A probationary teacher who became pregnant was forced to resign when her
pregnancy advanced to the point where she was no longer able to teach. Under the
school district rules, her resignation would cause her to lose the 2-1/2 years of proba-
tionary time she had accumulated towards tenure. If rehired, she would have to begin
anew as a first-year probationary teacher. The Commissioner of the Bureau of Labor
found discrimination and awarded $1000 damages for mental distress. Id. at 465-66,
534 P 2d at 1137.
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to establish causation of mental distress.52 The opinion distinguished
evidence of sex-based discrimination from evidence of racial discrim-
ination, which the court stated would establish causation. 3 The
court found the evidence of mental distress did not meet the substan-
tial evidence test.5
4
The New Jersey Supreme Court in Castellano apparently adopts
the approach taken by the Oregon Supreme Court in Nilsen. Al-
though it found a sexually discriminatory effect in the Board's
mandatory, one-year maternity leave policy, the court neglected to
apply the one-part test outlined in previous New Jersey decisions.
55
Applying the substantial evidence test directly to the facts supporting
mental distress, the court dismissed the Director's finding as insub-
stantial.56 But the court failed to discuss its rationale for application
of the two-part test or its reasons for finding insubstantial evidence of
52. The court held that the alleged discrimination could not cause the mental dis-
tress claimed. The complaint filed on behalf of the complainant by the Attorney Gen-
eral challenged only the requirement that she resign and not the rule that she take a
leave of absence for the remainder of the year. The complaint did not claim entitle-
ment to any loss of money for the balance of the year, nor that she should receive any
paid leave. The court found that complainant may well have considered her situation
to be emotionally trying and that she became insecure and upset about what the fu-
ture would bring. Her husband was starting a new business and needed the money
provided from her employment. She was caught in a controversy between the old and
the young factions among the teachers and between the two teachers' organizations.
In effect, she found herself in a position of conflict and financial insecurity, resulting
in anxiety. But the court held that this was not a direct result of the discrimination.
Id at 485-86, 534 P.2d at 1146.
53. Distinguishing this case from Williams v. Joyce, 4 Or. App. 482, 479 P.2d 513
(1971) (an earlier case in which the court upheld damages for mental distress), the
court held that in a racial discrimination case, an award of mental distress would be
proper "because of the indignity visited from the inference that black people are in-
ferior." The court held that no similar inference could be drawn from this case. 271
Or. at 486, 534 P.2d at 1146.
54. The court reasoned that since no one had reveled the complainant, accused
her of any impropriety or ridiculed her or embarrassed her because she was pregnant,
there was no evidence of humiliation. "If any awards for emotional and mental suf-
fering are made, such suffering must be of greater consequences and arise out of more
aggravated circumstances than those which the evidence disclosed in the case of the
present complainant." Id at 498, 534 P.2d at 1152.
55. The court did not cite the Nilsen case, but it acted similarly in not acknowl-
edging the causation test. It simply rejected the evidence of mental distress outright.
Castellano v. Linden Bd. of Educ., 79 N.J. 407, 412, 400 A.2d 1182, 1184 (1979).
56. The court found that the finding of mental distress was based on insubstantial
and "nebulous" evidence. Id at 411, 400 A.2d at 1184.
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mental distress. 57
The reviewing court, by failing to apply the one-part test, places
the burden of an additional element of proof upon victims of sex
discrimination who claim damages for mental distress.58 Courts can
thus review the Director's determination of mental distress apart
from the issue of discrimination. In practice, however, the applica-
tion of the substantial evidence test allows the court considerable dis-
cretion" which often results in inconsistent and uncertain
applications.6" Castellano reflects this in its disregard for precedent
without any reasoned elaboration.6
Since the facts of each case are unique, the test of whether a rea-
sonable mind could find the evidence sufficient to support the conclu-
sion reached in practice turns on whether the reviewing court believes
a reasonable mind could find the evidence sufficient. In effect, the
court is able to substitute its judgment for that of an administrative
agency.62 Theoretically, the reviewing court should not weigh the ev-
idence, determine the credibility of witnesses, or choose from among
57. The majority opinion simply stated that there was no basis for humiliation on
complainant's part because "[maternity leaves of absence of one kind or another are
commonplace." Id at 411, 400 A.2d at 1184.
58. Unlike victims of racial discrimination, victims of sex-based discrimination
have to prove discrimination and then prove mental distress. No inference will be
drawn that the discrimination itself would automatically cause the complainant to
feel humiliated. See School Dist. No. I v. Nilsen, 271 Or. 461, 486, 534 P.2d 1135,
1146 (1975).
59. See notes 62-67 and accompanying text infra.
60. Due to the extent of judicial discretion, the substantial evidence standard of
review cannot assure certainty of application. Because the facts of each case are
unique, it is almost impossible to avoid inconsistency and uncertainty of application.
Courts can and do take it upon themselves to see the administration of what they
deem to be the needs of justice. Thus, different policy preferences may dictate differ-
ent results in similar cases. 4 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 29.02
(1958).
Only by limiting judicial discretion can this result be avoided. Otherwise, "the ulti-
mate reliance for the fair operation of any standard is a judiciary of high competence
and character and the constant play of informed professional critique upon its work."
Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 489 (1951).
61. Castellano marks the first instance in which the New Jersey Supreme Court,
having found discrimination, reversed the Director's award of damages for mental
distress. Before this case, New Jersey courts had consistently upheld awards of such
damages, recognizing mental distress as a direct result of discrimination. See notes
40-48 and accompanying text supra.
62. Cf. R. Kramer, The Place and Function of Judicial Review in the Administrative
Process, 28 FORDHAM L. REV. 1 (1959).
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various reasonable inferences.63 In fact, however, courts perform
these functions when purportedly applying the substantial evidence
test.64 Because there is no clear line to distinguish between what is
and what is not permitted by the rule65 courts can use the substantial
evidence test to effectuate their own policy preferences, 66rendering
application of the standard of review meaningless. 67
The New Jersey Supreme Court's inability in Castellano to ade-
quately explain its reasons for finding the evidence of mental distress
insubstantial illustrates the inadequacy of the substantial evidence
test. The primary purpose of judicial review of administrative action
is to check overreaching by the agency, not to summarily disagree
with it's conclusions.6" A court should, then, have some responsibil-
ity for explaining how the agency exceeded its statutory powers or
acted arbitrarily in violation of fairness and due process considera-
tions.
The Division on Civil Rights seeks to eliminate discrimination and
remedy its effects. This specialized agency has superior fact-finding
ability, enabling it to recognize the potential harm caused by discrim-
ination. Therefore, if a court finds sufficient evidence to support the
agency's findings of discrimination, it should give deference to the
administrative determination that the victim suffered mental distress.
Application of this one-part causation test will eliminate judicial dis-
63. See notes 32-34 and accompanying text supra.
64. R. Kramer, The Place and Function of Judicial Review in the Administrative
Process, 28 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 84 (1959).
65. Id
66. See 4 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 29.02 (1958), in which
Davis sets forth the proposition that in reality, the substantial evidence test is a varia-
ble. Courts are both willing and able to stretch it in accordance with what they deem
to be the needs ofjustice. Id This is apparent in Castellano where the court placed a
great deal of emphasis on the fact that the Board of Education is a public body and
any damages that it would have to pay would come directly from taxpayer money.
Castellano v. Linden Bd. of Educ., 79 N.J. 407, 411, 400 A.2d 1182, 1184 (1979).
67. See E. Gellhorn & G. Robinson, Perspectives in Administrative Lan; 75
COLUM. L. REV. 771 (1975), in which the authors state:
At best, concepts such as 'substantial evidence' tend to be little more than conve-
nient labels attached to results reached without their aid. As evidence of their
unimportance, judicial opinions commonly do not even articulate the standards
of review employed, and when they do the articulation is seldom useful to under-
standing the result or predicting future results. . . . [T]he rules governing judi-
cial review have no more substance at the core than a seedless grape. ...
Id at 780.
68. See generally 4 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 29.01 (1958).
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cretion in reviewing agency findings of mental distress. The com-
plainant will no longer be placed in the tenuous position of guessing
what evidence will satisfy the court.
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